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I. Introduction
Ronald Guy was an at-will employee of Mutual of Omaha insurance
company (“Mutual”) from June 1992 until April 1995.1 He served as the general
manager of Mutual’s Memphis division and his duties included the recruitment,
training, and management of Mutual’s agents in Western Tennessee.2 In September
1992, Jerry Roberson applied to become an agent for Mutual.3 Before Guy finished
reviewing Roberson’s application, Mutual assigned Roberson an “agent production
number” and an “agent’s kit.”4 In December 1992, Roberson visited Doris Johnson
and represented himself as an agent of both Mutual and John Hancock Insurance
Company.5 During that visit, Roberson sold Johnson a Mutual annuity in exchange
for a stock certificate and checks payable to Mutual worth about $70,000.6 He then
deposited the checks into his personal account, retained possession of the stock
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certificate, and began mailing Johnson “annuity checks” which where actually written
on Roberson’s personal checking account.7
When Guy learned of this transaction, he suspected theft and reported the
incident to the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance.8 He did not
report the incident to Mutual until October 13, 1994 because until then he was not
aware that Roberson had represented himself as a Mutual agent.9 On November 4,
1994 Guy received a positive evaluation and salary increase from Mutual, but on
December 20, 1994 Mutual reduced Guy’s salary by half and reduced his bonus
income by 25 percent.10 This reduction in compensation came four days after
Mutual agreed to reimburse Doris Johnson for the $63,781.72 in losses she suffered
due to Jerry Roberson’s fraudulent annuity sale.11 Mutual fulfilled this agreement in
February 1995 when it delivered an annuity in the amount of $63,781.72 to Doris
Johnson.12 On March 1, 1995, Guy was placed on “written notice” and his bonus
income was further reduced by 20 percent.13 Guy’s supervisor explained that Guy
was placed on “written notice” due to his “‘lack of judgment’ in (1) his failure to
report the Roberson incident to Mutual when he reported it to state authorities, and
(2) his mishandling of [an earlier] sexual harassment complaint [made by a female
Mutual agent against one of Guy’s subordinates].”14 Mutual terminated Guy’s
employment on April 19, 1995 due to his “unacceptable performance as
demonstrated by failure to use judgment consummate with the position of General
Manager.”15 Mutual never mentioned, as a reason for Guy’s discharge, Guy’s report
to the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance regarding Jerry
Roberson’s fraudulent activity.16
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A month later, Guy filed suit against Mutual alleging a common law cause of
action for retaliatory discharge in violation of Tennessee state public policy.17 He
asserted that his report of Roberson’s fraudulent activity to the Tennessee
Department of Commerce and Insurance was a substantial factor in Mutual’s
decision to discharge him.18 In support of this allegation, Guy argued that he did not
receive negative work evaluations until Mutual accepted liability for Roberson’s
fraudulent activity.19 Mutual responded by arguing that Guy’s cause of action was
preempted by the Tennessee Public Protection Act, which requires a whistle-blowerplaintiff to prove that his or her whistle-blower activity was the sole motivating
reason for the plaintiff’s discharge.20 Thus, Mutual filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that Guy could not prevail in the case because he could not prove
that his reporting of Roberson’s activity was the sole motivation behind his
discharge.21
The trial court refused to grant the motion, but did not provide any
reasoning to support its decision.22 Mutual received permission to seek an
interlocutory review, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the Tennessee
Public Protection Act did preempt Guy’s common law cause of action for retaliatory
discharge in violation of Tennessee’s public policy to protect whistle-blowers.23 The
Court of Appeals also held, however, that Guy could still pursue a common law
retaliatory discharge claim under an alternative public policy violation—Tennessee’s

17

Id.

18 Id. at 536. In Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988), the Tennessee Supreme
Court first recognized as a legitimate cause of action a plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge when
the plaintiff’s refusal to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities was a substantial factor in
the employer’s decision to discharge the plaintiff.
19

Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 533.

20 Id. at 535; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2004) (stating that “[n]o employee shall be
discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about,
illegal activities”) (emphasis added). The Tennesseee Public Protection Act, also called the Tennessee
“Whistle-blower” Act, was enacted in 1990. Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 535.
21

Id. at 533.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 533-534.

450

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 6

public policy to protect consumers from unethical insurance agents.24 Under this
alternative theory, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to find that Guy’s reporting of Roberson’s fraud was a substantial factor in
Mutual’s discharge decision.25 The Tennessee Supreme Court then granted an appeal
“to consider whether the ‘Whistleblower’ statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304,
preempts the common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an
employee is discharged for reporting illegal or unethical activity.”26
II. The Emergence of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Tennessee
“[M]en must be left, without interference to . . . discharge or retain
employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without
thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.”27 With these words the Tennessee
Supreme Court adopted the employment-at-will doctrine in 188428 in Payne v. Western
& Atlantic Railroad Co.29 The employment-at-will doctrine presumes that employees
who are not hired for a definite period of time are at-will employees and can thus be
discharged by their employers without cause or notice.30 Although Tennessee was

Id. at 534. The Court of Appeals noted as evidence of this public policy Tennessee Code
Annotated § 56-6-155. Id. This section authorizes the Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance to
“suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew any [insurance agent’s] license” if the licensee or
prospective licensee engages in various listed unethical activities. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-6-155
(2000). It also authorizes the Commissioner to assess civil penalties amounting to between $100 and
$1,000 for each violation. Id.

24

25

Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 534.
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Id.

27 Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), rev’d on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179
S.W. 134, 137 (Tenn. 1915). Employment-at-will is also “a right which an employee may exercise in
the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer.” Id. at 518-19.
28 Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment
At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 764, 772 (1994) (verifying that Payne was the first application of the
employment-at-will doctrine in Tennessee).
29

81 Tenn. 507 (1884).

30 Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-At-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118
(1976). In Tennessee this rule even applies to employees granted permanent employment. Combs v.
Standard Oil Co., 59 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tenn. 1933).
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not the first state to formally adopt the doctrine,31 its expression of the doctrine is
certainly one of the most memorable.32 Ironically, the case did not involve wrongful
discharge, but rather involved an alleged tortious interference with business
relationships.33
Payne was the owner of a business located near the center of five railroad
termini leading into Chattanooga.34 This business had become quite profitable
selling goods to employees of the railroad, who worked in Chattanooga and along
the five rail lines.35 This came to an end, however, when the railroad threatened to
fire any employee who did business with Payne.36 Payne filed suit arguing that the
railroad used the threat of discharge to intimidate his customers and maliciously ruin
his business.37 The court stated that Payne would be entitled to recovery only if the
railroad’s threats of discharge were unlawful, and those threats could only be
unlawful if the railroad did not have the right to discharge its employees for doing
business with Payne.38 The court upheld the railroad’s right to discharge its
employees with the following reasoning:
Railroad corporations have in this matter the same right enjoyed by
manufacturers, merchants, lawyers and farmers. All may dismiss their
employe[e]s at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or
31 Morriss, supra note 28, at 699. By 1884 seven states had already adopted the employment-at-will
doctrine: Louisiana (1808), Maine (1851), Mississippi (1858), Wisconsin (1871), California (1872),
Illinois (1874), and Colorado (1876). Id.
32 See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653,
653 n.4 (2000) (describing the Payne court’s language as “a classic exposition on the employment-atwill rule”); Frederick J. Lewis & Jeffery A. Jarratt, Revisiting the Tennessee Employment-At-Will Doctrine—
What is the Exception and What is the Rule?, 19 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 171, 171 (1989) (describing the Payne
court’s language as “the exemplification of the American common law rule”).
33

Payne, 81 Tenn. at 508-11.
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Id. at 508-09.
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even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal
wrong. A fortiori they may “threaten” to discharge them without thereby
doing an illegal act, per se. The sufficient and conclusive answer to the
many plausible arguments to the contrary, portraying the evil to
workmen and to others from the exercise of such authority by the great
and strong, is: They have the right to discharge their employe[e]s. The
law cannot compel them to employ workmen, nor to keep them
employed. If they break contracts with workmen they are answerable
only to them; if in the act of discharging them, they break no contract,
then no one can sue for loss suffered thereby. Trade is free; so is
employment. The law leaves employer and employe[e] to make their own
contracts; and these, when made, it will enforce; beyond this it does not
go. Either the employer or employe[e] may terminate the relation at will,
and the law will not interfere, except for contract broken. This secures to
all civil and industrial liberty. A contrary rule would lead to a judicial
tyranny . . . .39
What is interesting about the reasoning expressed here is that the Tennessee
Supreme Court did not cite H.G. Wood’s famous treatise on master-servant law40
nor any case law as authority for the rule. Instead, the court based its adoption of
employment-at-will on the principle that courts should not interfere with the
contractual and economic liberty of those involved in the employment relationship.41
39

Id. 519-20.

The event that has been traditionally credited with placing employment-at-will on the path toward
dominance was its adoption by the legal treatise writer H.G. Wood. The significance of Wood’s
treatise has been questioned. Morriss, supra note 28, at 697-98 (arguing that Wood’s treatise was
relatively insignificant because “only a third of the common law adopters between 1880 and 1900
cited Wood”). In his 1877 treatise on master-servant law Wood clearly expressed the doctrine:

40

With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will,
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it
by proof. . . . [U]nless their understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a
certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of
either party, and in this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants.
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).
41 Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20. The emergence of a general theory of contract and the prevalence of
laissez faire economics inspired the creation of the employment-at-will doctrine. Feinman, supra note
30, at 124-27. Beginning in the 1870’s, a general theory of contracts was developed by legal theorists,
such as Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, which came to dominate legal thinking in the late nineteenth
century. Id. at 124. Under contract law, individuals were given the freedom to voluntarily assume
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The court expressed a desire to protect “civil and industrial liberty” from “judicial
tyranny.”42 The majority recognized the potential burden that this doctrine might
place on employees, but addressed this only by saying, “[t]he law cannot compel
[employers] to employ workmen, nor to keep them employed.”43 Justices Freeman
and Turney, however, dissented44 and anticipated that this doctrine would eventually
require exceptions:
The principle of the majority opinion will justify employers, at any rate
allow them to require employe[e]s to trade where they may demand, to
vote as they may require, or do anything not strictly criminal that
employer may dictate, or feel the wrath of employer by dismissal from
service. Employment is the means of sustaining life to himself and family
to the employe[e], and so he is morally though not legally compelled to
submit. Capital may thus not only find its own legitimate employment,
but may control the employment of others to an extent that in time may
sap the foundations of our free institutions. Perfect freedom in all
legitimate uses is due to capital, and should be zealously enforced, but
public policy and all the best interests of society demands it shall be
restrained within legitimate boundaries, and any channel by which it may

legal obligations and design the terms of the relationships that would exist among them. Id. The
common law would serve only as a foundation that individuals would build on to construct their own
private law, which would emanate from the intent of the parties. Id. This trend of legal independence
was complemented by the laissez faire economic and political thought which was prevalent during this
time. Id. Thus, these trends granted individuals greater freedom in their legal and economic affairs
and changed perceptions of the employer-employee relationship. Id. at 124-25. This relationship was
increasingly perceived as a limited commercial relationship instead of a long-term domestic
relationship. Id. at 125.
Contract theory’s emphasis on the intent of the parties affected the presumptions governing
indefinite employment contracts. Under the old English rule an indefinite employment contract was
presumed to be for a year and this presumption was based not on the intent of the parties but on the
needs and customs of the community. Id. at 119-20. Now presumptions would have to be inferred
from the intent of the parties and this new approach led to the employment-at-will doctrine.
42

Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20.
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Id.
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Id. at 528.
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escape or overleap these boundaries, should be carefully but judiciously
guarded.45
However, it would be a hundred years before the Tennessee Supreme Court would
adopt a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.46
III. The Emergence of the Public Policy Exception in Tennessee
Although the dissent in Payne anticipated that public policy exceptions would
be needed to contain some of the negative side effects of the employment-at-will
doctrine,47 it was one hundred years before the Tennessee courts would establish
such an exception.48 The birth of Tennessee’s public policy exception occurred in
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co.,49 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court first recognized a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge.50 The plaintiff in Clanton was an at-will
employee who was injured on the job and subsequently fired the day after she
reached a full settlement of her worker’s compensation claim.51 The Tennessee
Supreme Court held that employees discharged in retaliation for filing a worker’s
compensation claim would be permitted a cause of action against the employer
because such an action was “necessary to enforce the duty of the employer, to secure
the rights of the employee[,] and to carry out the intention of the legislature.”52 The
court also held that in similar, future cases successful plaintiffs would be allowed to
recover punitive damages.53

45

Id. at 543-44.
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Lewis, supra note 32, at 175.
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Payne, 81 Tenn. at 543-44.
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Lewis, supra note 32, at 175.

49

677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984).

50 Id. at 445; Carl A. Pierce, The Tennessee Supreme Court and the Struggle for Independence, Accountability, and
Modernization, 1974-1998, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 270, 291 (James W. Ely
Jr. ed., 2002).
51

Clanton, 667 S.W.2d at 442.

52

Id. at 445.
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Id.
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Central to the court’s judgment was its belief that retaliatory discharges were
implicitly prohibited by section 50-6-114 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, which
prohibits the use of any “device” which relieves the employer of his obligations
under the Worker’s Compensation Law.54 The court’s reasoning first looked to the
Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,55 which the
Tennessee Supreme Court described as “the leading case recognizing a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge.”56 The special significance of Frampton to the
Tennessee Supreme Court was that the Indiana Statute prohibiting devices was
nearly identical to the Tennessee statute.57 The Tennessee Supreme Court thus
found it highly persuasive that the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the threat
of retaliatory discharge fell into the category of devices prohibited by the statute.58
The Tennessee Supreme Court also noted that numerous states had reached results
similar to those in Frampton under similar statutes.59 In addition, the court mentioned
that numerous states had granted judicial remedies for retaliatory discharge through
statutory enactments.60
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court did recognize that several courts
had refused to follow Frampton because they believed that creating such a cause of
action should be left to the state legislature.61 Yet, the Tennessee Supreme Court
disagreed with these courts, arguing that the legislature’s purpose in creating the
Worker’s Compensation Law was to provide employees with “a certain and
expeditious remedy” and that “[r]etaliatory discharges completely circumvent this
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-114 (1999) (“No contract or agreement, written or implied, or rule,
regulation or other device, shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer, in whole or in part, of
any obligation created by [the Worker’s Compensation Law] . . . .”).
54

55

297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).

56

Clanton, 667 S.W.2d at 443.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 443-44.

Id. at 444. The Clanton court cited cases from Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New
Jersey, and Oregon. Id.
59

60 Id. The states mentioned in this category were California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
61

Id.
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legislative scheme.”62 The defense argued that the legislature had “expressly rejected
an action for retaliatory discharge” when a bill which would have permitted such an
action was rejected by a Senate committee.63 Neither the full Senate nor the full
House, however, voted against this bill.64 Thus, the court responded to the defense
by stating: “We are not persuaded that the action of one Senate committee in
recommending against passage of the bill constitutes a legislative intent to reject
actions for retaliatory discharge.”65
The court’s approach is logical. Although the work of a single Senate
committee appears to show an intent to allow retaliatory discharges, it would be
irrational for the General Assembly to permit such discharges. The General
Assembly did not exert the effort of creating the Workers’ Compensation Law
simply to see it eviscerated by the use of retaliatory discharges. Based on the
proposition that the General Assembly wanted the Workers’ Compensation Law to
succeed, it is logical to conclude that retaliatory discharges fall into the category of
devices prohibited by the General Assembly. Thus, the creation of an action for
retaliatory discharge was a reasonable means of protecting the General Assembly’s
intent.
IV. The Public Policy Exception and Employer-Endorsed Illegal Activities

A. A New Exception Emerges in the Tennessee Courts of Appeal
Although Clanton created a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine, the exception was strictly confined. The Tennessee Supreme Court
confined the exception to situations where retaliatory discharge was used in an
attempt to circumvent the Workers’ Compensation Law.66 The court never outlined
any general principles that could be used to develop other public policy exceptions to

62

Id.

63

Id. 445.

64

Id.

Id. One commentator has argued that “a contrary argument is equally plausible and perhaps more
persuasive.” Lewis, supra note 32, at 179 (“The [Tennessee General Assembly’s] failure to provide for
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for the exercise of one’s workers’ compensation rights
suggests that it did not favor such actions.”).
65

66

Clanton, 667 S.W.2d at 443-45.
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the at-will doctrine.67 Nevertheless, there developed a line of cases where plaintiffs,
who had been discharged for refusing to take part in illegal activities, requested that a
new exception be permitted for their situation.68
The first of these was Williams v. Tennessee Health Services,69 a case before the
Tennessee Court of Appeals for the Middle Section in which the plaintiff alleged that
she was discharged after she refused to falsify insurance reports so that her employer
could receive unearned revenue.70 The court reversed the lower court’s judgment of
dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings71 because “the present case
has the potential to present a record upon which another exception to the
employment at-will rule might be approved.”72 This holding is surprising considering
the strict interpretation of the at-will rule that the Middle Section expressed a few
years earlier in Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc.73 In Whittaker, the court had said: “It is not
the province of this court to change the law . . . . That prerogative lies with the
Supreme Court or with the legislature. However, . . . any substantial change in the
‘employee-at-will’ rule should first be microscopically analyzed regarding its effect on
the commerce of this state.”74 Now, approximately six months after the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s decision in Clanton, the Court of Appeals for the Middle Section
stated: “[I]t is the province of this [c]ourt to ascertain and apply the existing law and
to assist in developing a record from which the ultimate decision can be wisely made
in regard to any needed change in the law.”75

67

Id.; Lewis, supra note 32, at 179.

68 See, e.g., Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1989); Chism v. Mid-South Milling
Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988); Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 1 IER Cases 1780 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1985); Williams v. Tenn. Health Services, 1 IER Cases 1754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
69

1 IER Cases 1754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

70

Id. at 1755.

71

Id. at 1759.

72

Id. at 1757.

73

621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

74

Id. at 396.

75

Williams, 1 IER Cases at 1757.
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In Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co.,76 the Tennessee Court of Appeals for the
Eastern Section went further and held that “a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge arises when an at-will employee is terminated solely for refusing to
participate [in], continue to participate [in], or remain silent about illegal activities.”77
In Watson, the plaintiffs were truck drivers who alleged that they were fired because
they refused to violate state speed laws and federal rest regulations.78 In its reasoning
the court mentioned decisions by other jurisdictions that both supported and
opposed such an extension of the public policy exception.79 In addition, the court
noted the warning in Whittaker that changes to the employment-at-will doctrine
could have a negative impact on the state’s ability to attract new businesses.80 After
considering these authorities, the court concluded that “[s]ince the industry we seek
to attract and retain are corporate citizens who will respect our laws, we do not
believe the proposed exception would adversely affect the quality of the lives of our
citizens.”81

B. Opening Chism’s Exit: The Tennessee Supreme Court
Addresses a New Exception
It was not until Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co.82 that the Tennessee Supreme
Court dealt with a case involving an employee discharged for refusing to participate
in illegal activities.83 Chism was an appeal arising from the Tennessee Court of
76

1 IER Cases 1780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

77

Id. at 1783.

78

Id. at 1781.

79

Id. at 1782.

80

Tennessee has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of new industry of
high quality designed to increase the average per capita income of its citizens and thus,
better the quality of their lives. The impact on the continuation of such influx of new
businesses should be carefully considered before any substantial modification is made in
the employee-at-will rule.
Id. (quoting Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)).
81

Id. at 1783.

82

762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988).

83

Id. at 553.
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Appeals for the Western Section,84 in which the plaintiff alleged he was fired for
refusing to participate in procedures that allegedly violated the Internal Revenue
Code.85 The trial court rendered summary judgment for the employer, but the Court
of Appeals reversed.86 The Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the case because
the complaint was not sufficiently specific.87
What is interesting about Chism, however, is not the judgment rendered, but
the discussion of retaliatory discharge that was included in the opinion. Although
the court stated that “the exception cannot be permitted to consume or eliminate the
general rule[,]”88 it went on to describe general principles governing retaliatory
discharge that seemed less confining than those established in Clanton.89 Instead of
confining retaliatory discharge to situations where an employer is attempting to
circumvent the Workers’ Compensation Law, the Chism court gave the cause of
action a broader definition in which an employer would be liable for any “clear
violation [by the employer] of some well-defined and established policy” that was a
“significant factor in the termination of an at-will employee”90 The court described a
well-defined, established policy as one “[u]sually . . . evidenced by an unambiguous
constitutional, statutory[,] or regulatory provision.”91 This description of a welldefined policy provides a broad subject matter from which to find such policies both
because it includes regulatory in addition to constitutional and statutory provisions
and because its use of the word “usually” implies that such policies can even be
found outside this already broad subject matter.92 The court also listed “[e]xamples
of clearly defined public policies which warrant the protection provided by this cause
84

Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 1987 WL 30146 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1987).

85

Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 553-54.

86

Id. at 552-553.

87

Id. at 556-57.

88

Id. at 556.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Lewis, supra note 32, at 182.
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of action.”93 This list included: (i) discharge for refusal to commit perjury, (ii)
discharge for refusing to ignore a lawful subpoena, (iii) discharge for refusing to
ignore jury duty obligations, and (iv) discharge for refusing to falsify records or
participate in the mislabeling of unsafe or defective products.94 By giving a broader
definition of retaliatory discharge and a list of situations where retaliatory discharge
would be “warranted,”95 the Tennessee Supreme Court appeared to signal approval
of a broader interpretation of Clanton. In fact, when the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s case in Chism, the court was quick to state: “We do not intend to disparage
such an action. The [c]ourt is generally prepared to uphold such claims in
appropriate cases . . . .”96 Thus, Chism appeared to open an exit through which
employees could escape some of the dangers of the employment-at-will rule.

C. Closing Chism’s Exit: The Tennessee Supreme Court Hesitates
One year later, however, when Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co.97 reached the
Tennessee Supreme Court in 1989, the court showed little willingness to allow
Chism’s exit to expand. As discussed above,98 the plaintiffs in Watson alleged that
they were discharged for their refusal to violate state speed laws and federal rest and
speed regulations.99 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the
retaliatory discharge claim and held that “a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
arises when an at-will employee is terminated solely for refusing to participate [in],
continue to participate [in], or remain silent about illegal activities.”100 In its
reasoning, the Court of Appeals did not appear to rely on a statutory statement of

93

Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 557.

97

789 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1989).

98

See supra Part IV.A.

99

Watson, 789 S.W.2d at 539.

100

Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 1 IER Cases 1780, 1783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
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public policy.101 Instead, it relied on “the overriding public policy that the people of
this state should be encouraged to be law abiding citizens.”102
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s holding.103 In
doing so, it stated, “[w]e agree in principle with the expressed views of the lower
court, however . . . only in the most extraordinary circumstances should the courts of
this [s]tate impose their judgment in an area which, in the first instance, is clearly a
legislative function.”104 Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court interpreted the Court of
Appeals’ “overriding public policy” as an attempt by the Court of Appeals to declare
the public policy of the state, which is a role reserved for the legislature.105 The
Court of Appeals’ “overriding public policy” could not form the basis for a
retaliatory discharge claim because it was not clearly expressed by a constitutional or
legislative provision.106 In addition, the federal regulations that the plaintiff was
allegedly forced to violate could not form the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim
because state jurisdiction over those regulations was preempted by the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act.107
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s reversal in Watson did not mean that the court
was opposed to allowing employees discharged for refusing to condone or
participate in illegal activities to have a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, it
only meant that the court was opposed to expanding it beyond Chism.
We have heretofore in this opinion discussed the question of whether a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge may be maintained when an
employee at-will is terminated solely for refusing to participate in or
remain silent about illegal activity. We have written at some length on
this issue in [Chism]. We have expressed our accord with the Court of
101
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Appeals, that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge arises when an atwill employee is terminated solely for refusing to participate [in], continue
to participate [in], or remain silent about illegal activities. However, in
reference to this case, we believe the plaintiffs’ remedies lie within the
parameters of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. We do
not agree that it is appropriate for the courts of this [s]tate to establish
public policy or adopt an exception to the common-law by placing our
imprimatur thereon in the absence of some constitutional or legislative
precedent.108
Here the court’s reference to Chism, a case which potentially widened the public
policy exception, and the court’s claim to be in accord with the Court of Appeals
implies that the Tennessee Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action under
such facts, but only if there was an extremely clear expression of public policy from
the General Assembly. Even if such a clear expression of public policy exists in a
particular case, however, the court did not make clear whether an employee’s refusal
to condone illegal activity must be the sole reason for the employee’s termination
(the standard expressed by the Court of Appeals) or just a substantial factor (the
standard in Chism). Thus, the court in Watson signaled to the General Assembly that
a clear expression of public policy in support of whistle-blowers was needed, but it
did not give clear guidance regarding the standards to be used.
If Watson began closing Chism’s exit, Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Center.109
closed it. In Harney, the plaintiff alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for her
unfavorable testimony in a former co-worker’s workers’ compensation hearing.110
The Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed her case because her employer “made no
attempt to interfere with [her] testimony[,]” but instead had an “honest difference of
opinion . . . about whether her testimony was true or false.”111 In its reasoning the
Harney court redefined the holding in Clanton by stating that “Clanton did not create a
new exception to the [employment-at-will] rule.”112 Instead, the Clanton court merely
recognized that there was a cause of action implicit within the Workers’
108
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Compensation Law that prevented employers from using retaliatory discharge to
defeat the rights granted to employees by that law.113 Thus, “[t]he [Clanton] decision
was not intended as a license for the courts to enlarge on the employee-at-will rule or
create other exceptions to public policy or the common-law in the absence of some
constitutional or statutory precedent.”114

D. Chism’s Exit Fully Opens
Following the Watson and Harney decisions, the Tennessee General Assembly
passed the Public Protection Act of 1990.115 The Act states that “[n]o employee shall
be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to
remain silent about, illegal activities.”116 Thus, the General Assembly expressed a
public policy in favor of protecting whistle-blowers.117 The Act did little else because
it adopted the “sole reason” standard mentioned in Watson, which created a cause of
action only if the employee’s termination was motivated solely by his or her refusal
to tolerate illegal activity, a standard that would be quite difficult to prove.118 Thus,
the Tennessee General Assembly reopened Chism’s exit, but only narrowly.
Beginning in 1992 the Tennessee Supreme Court began to change its view of
the public policy exception with decisions that rejected the views expressed in Watson
and Harney. In Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co.,119 the court rejected the Harney
interpretation of Clanton.
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115 The Tennessee General Assembly passed the Public Protection Act on March 29, 1990. 1990
Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 771. It is codified in the Tennessee Code Annotated at § 50-1-304. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2003).
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Clanton is not limited to retaliatory discharge actions arising from an
employee’s exercise of workers’ compensation rights, but rather makes
the tort action of retaliatory discharge available to employees discharged
as a consequence of an employer’s violation of a clearly expressed
statutory policy. . . .
....
. . . [W]e are prepared to recognize a right to recovery for retaliatory
discharge in cases where an employer violates a clear public policy
evidenced by an unambiguous statutory provision.120
In fact, the Hodges court went so far as to describe Clanton as the case in which “we
recognized an exception to [the employment at will] rule.”121 This was a complete
about-face from the court’s previous statement in Harney that “Clanton did not create
a new exception to the [employment-at-will] rule.”122
The final step, in rejecting Watson and finally recognizing a new public policy
exception, came with Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc.123 In Reynolds, the plaintiffs
were truck drivers who alleged that they were terminated because they refused to
violate safety regulations adopted pursuant to the Tennessee Motor Carriers Act.124
Although the trial court had found for the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed,
arguing that a claim for retaliatory discharge could not be based upon the facts in the
case because the Tennessee Motor Carriers Act did not “provide any basis for a
public policy exception to the employment-at-will law of Tennessee.”125 The
Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.126 The
court, citing Hodges, Anderson, and Chism, stated that an action for retaliatory
discharge would “lie where the employer has violated a clear public policy evidenced
by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision and the
120
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employer’s violation was a substantial factor in the employee’s discharge.”127 The
court concluded that the Motor Carriers Act was an expression of public policy by
the state legislature and that all the elements of retaliatory discharge were present in
the case.128 The Tennessee Supreme Court had finally allowed a plaintiff, who had
been discharged for refusing to condone illegal activity, to recover for retaliatory
discharge.
Reynolds was extremely important to the development of a second public
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule, but it still left some loose ends. The
decision was important because it clearly held that a common law cause of action for
retaliatory discharge was available to employees discharged for refusing to engage in
or remain silent about illegal activates. The Reynolds decision was also important
because it clearly held that Chism’s substantial factor standard, rather than Watson’s
sole factor standard, was to be used in retaliatory discharge cases dealing with
employer endorsed illegal activities.129 However, two important questions were not
fully answered. First, does the Tennessee Public Protection Act preempt this
common law cause of action? The Reynolds court implied that there was no
preemption, but did not provide an explicit answer to this question.130 Second, has
the Reynolds holding created a durable new exception to the at-will rule or, like Chism,
will the Reynolds holding be diluted by subsequent opinions? Eight years later, in Guy
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,131 the Tennessee Supreme Court would answer both
of these questions.
V.
Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.:
The Tennessee Supreme Court Verifies Reynolds
In Guy the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the Tennessee Public
Protection Act “is cumulative to, and does not preempt, the common law tort
remedy for retaliatory discharge claims where the employee was discharged for
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reporting illegal or unethical conduct.”132 In doing so the court also verified that (1)
Tennessee has a common law cause of action for “retaliatory discharge when the atwill plaintiff-employee is discharged for refusing to remain silent about illegal
activities”133 and (2) “[t]he plaintiff in such an action must demonstrate that the
employer’s violation was a ‘substantial factor in the employee’s discharge.’”134 Thus,
Guy both clarified and stabilized Tennessee law regarding this type of retaliatory
discharge claim.
In an opinion written by Justice Barker, the court first summarized
Tennessee’s common law regarding retaliatory discharge claims in the context of
employer endorsed illegal activities.135 The court noted that “Tennessee has long
adhered to the common law employment-at-will doctrine, which provides that an
employment contract for an indefinite term is terminable at the will of either the
employer or the employee for any cause or for no cause.”136 Having stated the
general rule, Justice Barker further explained that the “traditional at-will rule is not
absolute,” an employee discharged for refusal to remain silent about illegal activities
has a cause of action under the common law if he or she can show that such refusal
was a substantial factor in the employer’s discharge decision.137
The discussion then turned to the Tennessee Public Protection Act of 1990,
and the court quoted its relevant provisions.138
(a) No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to
participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities.
....

132

Id. at 537.

133

Id. at 535.

Id. (quoting Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tenn. 1988)) (emphasis added
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(d)Any employee terminated in violation of subsection (a) shall have a cause
of action against the employer for retaliatory discharge and any other
damages to which the employee may be entitled.139
According to the court, the goal of the Act was “to protect employees from being
discharged in retaliation for ‘blowing the whistle’ on infractions of rules, regulations,
or the law pertaining to the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.”140
Mutual of Omaha insurance company (“Mutual”), the defendant-employer,
argued that when the Tennessee Public Protection Act was enacted it codified the
common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an at-will employee is
discharged for reporting illegal activities.141 Mutual further asserted that, because the
statutory cause of action preempted the common law cause of action, the common
law’s substantial factor standard was no longer available to plaintiffs.142 Therefore,
Guy would have to prove that his whistle blowing activity was the exclusive reason
for his discharge.143
On the other hand, Guy argued that the common law and statutory causes of
action were cumulative.144 Thus, he was not required to carry the heavy burden
required in the statute.145 Instead, he could bring his claim under the common law
cause of action and enjoy its lighter burden of proof, allowing him to recover if he
could prove that his whistle blowing activity was a substantial factor in Mutual’s
discharge decision.146
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Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court was forced to decide whether the
Tennessee Public Protection Act preempted the common law cause of action.
Justice Barker outlined three arguments supporting the conclusion that the Act did
not abrogate the common law.147 First, “the clear and plain language of the text
contains no . . . indication of exclusivity.”148 “[W]here a common law right exists and
a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory remedy is cumulative ‘absent
language showing that [it is] intended to be exclusive.’”149 Second, “if the legislature
had wanted to foreclose a common law cause of action, it had more than ample
opportunity to do so; indeed, it could have done so . . . in 2000 [when] it amended
the statute.”150 Third, “close examination of the statute reveals key distinctions from
the common law tort, further indicating the cumulative, rather than the preemptive,
nature of the statutory remedy.”151 For example, the statute increased the burden of
proof to require the plaintiff to show that whistle blowing activity was the sole
reason for being discharged, and the statute extended protection to public
employees.152 Based on this analysis the court held “that [the Tennessee Public
Protection Act] is cumulative to, and does not preempt, the common law tort
remedy for retaliatory discharge claims where the employee was discharged for
reporting illegal or unethical conduct.”153
The court then went on to evaluate the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
which had denied Mutual’s motion for summary judgment.154 The Tennessee
Supreme Court agreed with Guy that § 56-6-155 of the Tennessee Insurance Law
evidenced Tennessee’s public policy to protect consumers from unethical insurance
agents.155 The court concluded that this was a sufficiently “well-defined and
147
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established public policy” to serve as “the basis for [Guy’s] retaliatory discharge
claim.”156 Finally, the court also concluded that “there [was] a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Mr. Guy’s whistle blowing activity was a
substantial factor in Mutual’s decision to discharge him.”157 Thus, the Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.158
VI. Conclusion: The Consequences of Guy
An important consequence of the Guy decision is that it helped to eliminate
the uncertainty that arose in the wake of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in
Watson and the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The Watson decision created
uncertainty because it did not clearly state the standard of proof required of the
plaintiff in the common law cause of action.159 Would it be the substantial factor
standard from Chism or the sole reason standard developed by the Tennessee Court
of Appeals? The Tennessee Public Protection Act created uncertainty by raising the
possibility of statutory preemption of the common law cause of action and its
standard of proof. In Reynolds, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the standard
of proof in the common law cause of action is the substantial factor standard, but it
only implied that the common law cause of action was not preempted.160 Guy
explicitly held that the common law cause of action and its substantial factor
standard were not preempted.161 Thus, an important consequence of the Guy
decision was greater clarity.
The most powerful consequence of the Guy decision is that it prevented the
only remedy available to wrongfully discharged whistle-blower employees from
becoming a paper tiger. If the Tennessee Supreme Court had held that the
CODE ANN. § 56-6-155 (2000). It also authorizes the Commissioner to assess civil penalties
amounting to between $100 and $1,000 for each violation. Id.
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Tennessee Public Protection Act preempted the common law cause of action, all
whistle-blower plaintiffs would have been forced to carry the exceedingly heavy
burden of proving that their whistle-blower activities were the exclusive reason for
their discharge. This is so difficult to prove that it would have made the cause of
action practically unavailable to most whistle-blower employees. After Guy, privately
employed whistle-blower plaintiffs may now confidently rely on the common law
cause of action with its lighter substantial factor standard. Public employees
discharged for whistle-blowing, however, are left with the paper tiger because the
statutory cause of action is the only means though which they may assert retaliatory
discharge claims; the common law cause of action never applied to them.162 Thus, as
far as public employees are concerned, Guy had no real effect, but for private
employees, Guy relegated the Tennessee Public Protection Act’s sole reason standard
to the dustbin of history.

Public employees discharged for engaging in whistle-blower activities may not assert the common
law cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Williams v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 890 S.W.2d
788, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Montgomery v. Mayor of Covington, 778 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1988). Public employee whistle-blowers had no such cause of action until § 50-1-304 was
amended in 1997. 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 511.
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